RECENT CASES.
ADVERSE POSSESSION.
Where A executes a mortgage on part of his land, believing
it to cover the whole tract, and upon foreclosure and sale,
True Owner In attorns to D, the purchaser, as tenant, pays rent
Possession as for ten years and at the end of the lease, without
Tenant
claiming title, surrenders possession to B, the
grantee of D, to whom a deed covering the whole tract has been
executed, D has acquired title to the whole by adverse possession, though he was not in by color of title except by payment
of taxes, though physical possession never passed out of A,
and though the record disclosed the true boundaries. Steckter
v. Ewing, 93 Pac. (Cal.) 286.
Adverse possession must be actual, hostile, exclusive, open,
xotorious and continuous during the statutory period, five years
in California, failure of any one of which bars title by adverse
possession. Collins v. Lynch, x67 Pa. 635; Ward v. Cochran,
150 U. S. 597; Creekmur v. Creekmur, 75 Va. 43 o .

In the principal case, the disseisor paid the taxes on the whole
tract which was enclosed within one fence and the owner,
during the full period, treated the disseisor as the owner. The
decision can be supported under Royer v. Bentlow, io S. & R.
303, which holds that the payment of taxes gives color of title.
But it is held that where the lessee, under belief that he is
occupying only the demised premises, occupies land beyond the
boundaries thereof, of which the lessor never had possession,
nor claimed title to, nor included in the lease, the lessee's possession is not that of the lessor so as to make him a disseisor.
Holmes v. Turner, 15o Mass. 547. So where the lessee of a
minor entered and took wrongful possession and the lessor received the rent without ever personally entering upon the land
as owner, the lessor is not a disseisor. Matheson & Trots Case,
i Leon. 209. Where one co-owner occupies as tenant of the
other, who is in under color of title, the exclusive character of
the possession is not destroyed. Belles v. Belles, 122 Mass. 414.
Under these cases there may be some doubt as to the exclusive
character of the possession in the leading case.
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BILLS AND NOTES.
The Uniform Negotiable Instrument Law is declaratory of
the Law Merchant in that, where a note is endorsed to A as
"cashier," "agent" or "successors in office," it is

an anomalous endorsement in which delivery .to
the principal without endorsement on the 'note, is
in due course, but, where the endorsement is to such person
personally, transfer must be made by endorsement on the note
to be in due course so as to bar the equities of the antecedent
parties. Bank v. McCulloch, 93 Pac. (Or.) 366.
It is generally held that if a note be payable to an individual with the mere suffix of his official character, such suffix
is a mere descriptio personae. Hatley v. Pike, -62 Ill. 241. In
other jurisdictions, it is held to show the character in which the
person acts. Babcock v. Beman, ii N. Y. 200; Folk v. Moebs,
127 U. S. 597. The relation of principal and agent must appear
in the instrument, but if it is ambiguous as to the real party
intended such ambiguity may be explained by parol. Schmittler v. Simon, 114 N. Y. 176.
Endorsementr

CONTRACTS.
A bankrupt was managing agent for a life insurance company, under a contract having several years to run, which entitled
him to an interest in renewal premiums on policies

previously written when they should be collected,
as long as the contract was in force, subject to the
right of the company to terminate such interest if dissatisfied.
Held, the contract as a whole being based on trust and confidence, was not transferable, yet the rights under the contract
passed to the trustee, who would be entitled to the interest in
the premiums which had come due since the filing of the petition, even though the company might defeat the object of the
transfer by withholding its consent. In re Wright, 157 Fed.
Bankruptcy.

544-

The Act of July, 1898, c. 541 (30 Stat. 565), provides that
the trustee shall be vested with all the property which prior to
the filing of the petition the bankrupt could "by any means have
transferred

* *

*."

But personal privileges subject to restrictions in transfer
have been held to vest in trustees in bankruptcy. So a seat in
a stock exchange, though the assignee must be elected before
enjoying the privileges. In re Gaylord, iii Fed. 717. And a
liquor license, where assignee must be approved by the court.
In re Becher, 98 Fed. 4o7.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
The Supreme Court of the United States in Adair v. U. S.
(advance sheets March ist, page 277), declares section 1o of
the Act of June ist, 1898, to be unconstitutional.

I-terstce
Co-,merce

Section io makes it a criminal offense for an officer

of an interstate carrier to discharge an employee
from service to such carrier, because of his membership in a
labor organization. The court holds that this provision cannot
be referred to the clause of the constitution giving Congress
power to regulate interstate commerce, for there is no legal or
logical connection between an employee's membership in a
labor organization and the carrying on of interstate commerce,
and that the provision is condemned by the fifth amendment.
In Howard v. Illinois C. R. Co. (Adv. sheets Feb. i, page
14), the majority of the court were of the opinion that the
regulation of the relation of master and servant between carriers engaged in interstate commerce, was a regulation of such
commerce. Mr. Justice McKenna, who dissented in the Adair
case, was of the opinion that this case was an "immediate and
guiding light" to the decision at which he arrived.
It should be borne in mind that in the Adair case the Act
under discussion was considered repugnant to the fifth amendment, while the only question in the Howard case was a regulation of interstate commerce.

DISCOVERY.
The plaintiff sued on a judgment obtained in England in an
action by the defendant against the plaintiff's assignor. The
Productionof

Documents
Before Trial

defendant averred that the English suit was
brought without his authority. In order to dis-

cover the truth of this assertion, an order was
granted, on motion for the production of the defendant's books
before trial, under section 724, U. S. Rev. Stat. Shaefer v.
InternationalPower Co., 157 Fed. 896 (S. N. N. Y. Circuit).
This case is in accord with the current of authority, Exchange
Bank v. Wichita Cattle Co., 61 Fed. 19o; Brown v. McDonald,
133 Fed. 867.
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ELEVENTH AMENDMENT.
An action against the Attomey-Gen-ral and prosecuting officers of a State to enjoin them from instituting criminal proceedings is in effect an action against the State,
SuitAgainst
and cannot be maintained in a court of the United
Attorney
General
States under the eleventh amendment to the constitution. Logan and Bryan v. Postal, etc., Co., 157 Fed. 570.
In Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Andrews, 154 Fed. 95,
with facts similar to those in the principal case, it was held, that
a suit by a foreign telegraph company was an action against
the defendants merely in their capacity as attorneys for the
State, and was in effect a suit against the State, within the
eleventh amendment.
The principle as laid down, by Chief Justice Marshall in
Osborn v. Bank of U. S., 9 Wheat. 738 (1824), that a State is
not sued unless it is named as a defendant upon the record,
may be said to have been abandoned long ago. A federal court
has no jurisdiction of a suit against a State officer to coerce
performance of a contract by the State. However, it may take
jurisdiction of a suit against such an officer to enjoin a threatened injury to a vested right under authority of an unconstitutional statute of the State. Yale College v. Sanger (C. C.), 62
Fed. 177 (1894).

See note
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INSURANCE.
A was executed for crime by the State and his estate sued
on an insurance policy, payable to his personal representatives,
which contained no stipulation covering the point
Recovery
at issue. Recovery was allowed on the ground
where the Insured is Exe- that, forfeiture for attainder of blood having been
abolished by the federal constitution, the policy,
CrimefOr
like all other choses in action, passed to his personal representatives. Collins v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 83
N. E. (Ill.) 542.

In the case of suicide the question of recovery has resolved
itself into two divisions: first, where the policy is made payable
to the estate of the deceased; secondly, where it is vested in a
particular beneficiary. Recovery is denied in the first class,
because, it is said, a man should not be allowed to increase his
estate by crime. Ritter v. Ins. Co., 169 U. S. 139. In the
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INSURANCE (Continued).
second class relief is granted. Morris v. Life Ins. Co., 183 Pa.
563; Darrowv. Family Fund Soc., 116 N. Y. 537.
This division does not appear in the cases involving the question under consideration. The decision of Amicable Society v.
Bolland, 4 Bligh (N. R.) 194 (1830), refuses payment on a
policy on a state of facts directly in point. This case was decided prior to the abolition of forfeiture from crime in England
and was therefore aptly put on public policy. In Burt v. Insurance Co., 187 U. S. 362, also on all fours with the case under
discussion, recovery was denied.
In a litigation involving the same parties as the present case,
the two decisions cited, which seem to be the only cases squarely
in point, were approved and followed; Collins v. Ins. Co., 27
Pa. Super. Ct. 353. These rulings seem to adhere to the first
division of the suicide cases.

SALES.
A dealer who keeps for sale specific well-known brands of
piping for the particular purpose of driving oil wells and who
knows that the buyer intends using it for such purBy Dealerpose, impliedly warrants the fitness of the piping
rantles-Fitfor the known contemplated use, and the fact that
ness
for Purpose Intended the buyer designated a particular brand of piping
which the seller furnished, does not prevent the
implied warranty of fitness from arising. Oil Well Supply Co.
v. Priddy (Indiana), 83 N. E. 623.
The case of Jaricki M'f'g Co. v. Kerr, 165 Pa. 529, reaches a
contrary decision upon almost the identical facts, holding, "that
where the buyer ordered a particular brand of tubing to be used
for an oil well, which was delivered to him, it is no defense
that it was not suitable for the purpose for which he wanted it,
although the seller knew the use to which it was to be put."
The latter case was judged per curiam to fall within the third
rule as designated by Justice Mellor in the case of Jones v. Just,
L. R. 3 Q. B. 197, to wit, "Where a known, described and definite article is ordered of a manufacturer, although it is stated
to be required by the purchaser for a particular purpose, still
if the known, prescribed and defined thing be actually supplied
there is no warranty that it shall answer the particular purpose
intended by the buyer." Myers, J., brings the present case
under the fourth and fifth rule as laid down by Justice Mellor,
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SALES (Continued).
that where a dealer undertakes to supply an article in which he
deals, for a particular known purpose, so that the purchaser
relies upon the judgment and skill of the dealer, there is an
implied warranty that the article shall be reasonably fit for the
purpose intended. English and many American jurisdictions
accord. Zimmerman v. Dreucker, 44 N. E. 557; Emaho Coal
Co. v. Fay, 37 Neb. 48. Contra, Thompson v. Libby, 35 Minn.
443; Dounce v. Dow, 64 N. Y. 411; Gerst v. Jones & Co., 32
Gratt (Va.) 518.

B, after having lumber belonging to A upon his premises for
thirty days, verbally offered to buy it from A. A the next day
accepted the order. Five days later B repudiated
Statute of
the contract. Held, that since B did not repudiate
FraudsandttMIICC
the sale immediately on getting A's acceptance of
his offer, there was acceptance and receipt of the
goods sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. Godkin v.
Weber, 114 N. W. 924. One person in possession of another's
goods may become the purchaser of them by parol, and may
do subsequent acts which amount to an acceptance and receipt
within the statute. Benjamin on Sales, 5th Ed. 215. Very
slight evidence is sufficient to show acceptance and receipt,
as where a factor, having property of his principal in his possession, purchased it by parol and then sold it, which, of course,
under his contract of factorship he was entitled to do. Edan
v. Dudfield, i Q. B. 302. But it must clearly appear that the
conduct of the buyer in dealing with goods already in his possession is wholly inconsistent with the fact that his former
possession continues unchanged. Lillywhite v. Devereux, 15
M. & W. 283.

As there was nothing in the principal case

inconsistent with the possession which existed before the sale
remaining unchanged, it is submitted that the case should not
have gone to the jury. Silkman Co. v. Hunhols, 112 N. W.
1081.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
A conveyed land to B, part of the consideration was B's
oral promise to pay certain notes given by A. The notes were
not due within a year. Held, the contract being
Agreements
completely executed on one side was not within
pNot
farmed within not to be performed within a year must be in
a year
the statute of frauds, providing that agreements
writing. Supreme Court of Colorado in Enos v. Anderson,
93 Pac. 475-
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STATUTE OF FRAUDS (Continued).
The rule adopted here appears to have had its origin in
Donellan v. Read, 3 Barn. & Ald. 899.
In this country the rule is generally held to apply, but only
when nothing remains to be done but the payment of money.
Curtis v. Sage, 35 Ill. 22; Reed v. McCormick, 45 S. E. 868.
It has been held that where both sides of the contract are
executory, an action would lie against the party whose promise
was capable of being performed within the year, but not against
the party whose promise was not to be performed within the
year. Sheeby v. Adarene, 41 Vt. 541.
The arguments in favor of the view that such a contract
is within the statute unless it is to be completely executed
within the year, seem to be based on a sounder interpretation
of the statute. Marcy v. Marcy, 9 Allen 8; Browne on the St.
of Fr., page 382 (5th Ed).
WILLS.
A statute in the jurisdiction provides that the will of a
testator shall be "signed by him or by some person in his
presence and by his express direction." A testaMNakinga
tor's name, without his request, was placed at the
MarkforaSignature

end of a proposed will and the testator then made

his mark. Held, that this was a sufficient sign-

ing within the statute. In Re Tierney's Est., 114 N. W. 838.
That the testator's mark is a sufficient signing of a will has
long been settled. In Re Bryce, 2 Curt. Eccl. Rep. 325. It
is immaterial whether the testator can write or not. Baker v.
Dening, 8 Adol & El. 94. In Pennsylvania under the Wills
Act of 1833 a mark was held an insufficient signing, Asay v.
Hoover, 5 Pa. 21; but this was cured by the Act of January
27, 1848. Where there are both the mark of the testator and
his name signed either at his request or otherwise, the mark
is the signature and not the name written near it. Jackson v.
Jackson, 39 N. Y. 153. However, where a statute in the jurisdiction requires that one who signs the testator's name at his
request must subscribe as a witness and state the request, it
has been held that when there is such a signature together
with the testator's mark, the written name is the signing required by the statute and excludes the mark. McGee v. Porter,
14-Mo. 6II. But if the name has been written other than by
request the same Court has said that the mark is a sufficient
signing. Northcutt v. Northcutt, 20 Mo. 266.
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WILLS (Continued).
A statute in the jurisdiction provides that every will devising in express terms or by intent all of the testator's real
Passing of Af- estate, shall be construed to pass all he owned at
'his death. Testator's will read: "I give * * *
ter-AcquIrd
Re

prrty

to my husband all my real estate * * * of which

I am now possessed." Subsequent to the making of the will
the testator sold a farm and purchased other real estate. Held,
that the words, "of which I am now possessed," did not prevent
the after acquired property from passing. Hodgkins v. Hodgkins, io8 N. Y. Sup. 173.

Under modem statutes in considering whether after acquired realty is to pass, the intention of the testator is to control, and that is to be gathered from the whole will. Lent v.
Lent, 3 N. Y. 436. The particular combination of words
found in the principal case-"all my real estate of which I am
now possessed" has been construed so as not to pass after
acquired property where the word "now" was used in other
parts of the devise, plainly having reference to the time of
executing the will. Cole v. Scott, i MacN. & G. 518. Similarly, where certain property which the testator at the time
of making his will intended subsequently to acquire, was mentioned by name, this was held to exclude other after acquired
property. Quinn v. Hardenbrook, 54 N. Y. 83. But where
the word was used by itself with nothing to show that the
testator meant the word now to refer to the date of making the
will, it has been held, as in the principal case, that after
acquired property passed. Lent v. Lent, 31 N. Y. 436.

